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Experimental evidence of context-dependent 
preferences in risk-free settings 
Eike B. Kroll, Holger Müller, and Bodo Vogt 
Abstract: This study investigates context effects in general and the compromise effect in particular. It is 
argued that earlier research in this area lacks realism, a shortcoming that is a major drawback to research 
conclusions and stated management implications. The importance of this issue is stressed by previous 
research showing that behavioral anomalies found in hypothetical experimental settings tend to be 
significantly reduced when real payoff mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, to validate the compromise 
effect, an enhanced design is presented with participants making binding purchase decisions in the 
laboratory. We find that the compromise effect holds for real purchase decisions, and therefore is validated, 
and is not an artificial effect in surveys on hypothetical buying decisions. While conclusions and 
implications for marketing managers, derived in previous work assume that context effects hold for real 
market decisions, the results created by this enhanced design close this gap in the literature. 
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1  Introduction 
In the field of individual decision-making, experimental economists have provided 
various results indicating anomalies of rational choice models such as the Allais paradox 
(Allais 1952) or the preference reversal phenomenon (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; 
Grether and Plott 1979). These anomalies occur in decisions that involve risk in the form 
of lotteries and are supposed to provide evidence of violations of expected utility theory. 
The experimental evidence in turn has motivated theoretical work relaxing the axiomatic 
structure of rational choice models and incorporating the experimental results (Machina 
1982; Quiggin 1982). Typically, these anomalies are addressed by modifications of 
rational choice theory, by modifying the utility function, for example by introducing 
reference-points (Köszegi and Rabin 2007), introducing probability weights instead of 
linear probabilities (Yaari 1987) or both (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and 
Tversky 1992). 
A different anomaly not considered by modifications of expected utility theory is the 
influence of the choice set itself on the preference order of a given set of alternatives. As 
an example, it has been shown that the ranking of a number of lotteries differs depending 
on the composition of the larger menu within a menu of other lotteries (Bateman et al. 
2006). While this work does not consider choice behavior, it refers to the composition of 
a preference order between a subset of different alternatives that are not necessarily the 
best alternatives in a complete set of options. 
While all of the anomalies mentioned above are concerned with decisions under risk, 
violations of rational choice models are not necessarily limited to this area of research. 
The marketing literature intensively discusses a variety of so-called context effects, 
which stipulate that the choice between two alternatives can be affected by adding a 
particular third alternative to the choice set (Simonson 1989; Simonson and Tversky 
1992). This effect is similar to what Bateman et al. (2006) find for preference orders of 
lotteries, but in this case the actual choice of alternatives is affected rather than the 
preference order of alternatives that are not the preferred alternative in the set. 
Another study examines the influence of a menu of options from which only one option 
is available for choice in the experiment (Sonsino 2010). It can be shown that the 
valuation of the option under consideration depends on the priming by the choice set 
shown previous to the valuation task of a single option.  
An effect similar to the preference reversal phenomenon concerns the evaluation of 
bundles of alternatives. While rational choice theory assumes that the value of a bundle 
of items is the sum of the values of the single items, experimental data shows that the 
value of a bundle can decrease when a different set of items is added to the same bundle, 
depending on whether the bundle under consideration is presented juxtaposed or in 
isolation (List 2002).  
Research revealing violations of rational choice theory consists of both hypothetical 
questionnaires and laboratory-based studies involving real consequences of choices. In 
order to evaluate whether or not it is necessary to consider such violations for application 
of economic theory, it seems necessary to use experimental methods to show that they are 
a robust and systematic phenomenon and not merely caused by choice error. This occurs 
because the introduction of economic commitments is likely to reduce anomalies 
(Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann 2001). Another established fact is 
that the introduction of real incentives significantly reduces response variance (Smith and 
Walker 1993). The argument is that the decision process requires mental effort from the 
subjects, which they try to minimize when questions are presented hypothetically 
(Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Only the provision of real consequences of the decisions 
gives adequate incentive for the rational decision-maker to invest mental effort to the task 
at hand. This in turn is intended to reduce errors in eliciting true preferences. In order to 
judge whether an anomaly has to be considered robust, the introduction of real incentives 
and the use of experimental procedures are vital to establish knowledge about departures 
from rational choice theory. 
Experimental research aims at investigating decisions in real economic environments 
while the laboratory helps economists create and control such an environment. However, 
the situation in the laboratory remains an artificial one in the way that it differs from 
situations of everyday choice that people face in real life. Some argue that the anomalies 
identified in the laboratories do not occur when real market settings are applied (Cox and 
Grether 1996). The basic argument is that the anomalies occur in the laboratory in a 
situation that the subjects are largely unfamiliar with. The market mechanism is assumed 
to help the participants to realize they may be making a mistake and by that reduces the 
anomalies under investigation. 
This paper addresses context effects on choice behavior as it is known from the 
marketing literature. Considering the bulk of studies on the topic in marketing research, 
several drawbacks became salient and should be discussed briefly. First, researchers most 
often observe hypothetical choices in classroom surveys, hence excluding economic 
commitments for subjects. However, following the arguments in favor of rational choice 
models from risk research, anomalies can be significantly reduced when real incentives 
are introduced (Smith and Walker 1993; Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and 
Ortmann 2001; List and Gallet 2001). In addition, in the majority of cases, participants 
perform forced choices, meaning that the option not to buy any of the alternatives under 
consideration is not included in the set of possible answers. In sharp contrast, there is 
experimental evidence that choice shares observed in forced decisions are prone to 
produce anomalies and differ from settings including a no-buy option (Dhar 1997; Dhar 
and Simonson 2003). Moreover, almost all studies on context effects provide artificial 
options, excluding real brand names as general information cues that are evidently of 
great importance in consumers’ decisions. In particular, the importance of this issue is 
stressed by recent experimental results showing that brand familiarity significantly 
moderates the efficacy of context effects (Novemsky et al. 2007; Sinn et al. 2007).  
To sum up this brief review, while context effects are well established within the 
marketing literature, the empirical evidence remains based on artificial designs in terms 
of inexperienced subjects making forced choices between fictitious options in a 
hypothetical setting. Therefore, this paper provides experimental results for purchase 
decisions in the lab for fast-moving consumer goods, which are purchased frequently and 
on a regular basis by the subjects under investigation. The results show that context 
effects are reduced by introducing real consequences, but remain a robust phenomenon 
even for real purchase decisions, thus violating the main assumption of stable underlying 
preferences.  
2  Experiment 
2.1  Experimental task 
The experimental task is provided in form of a paper and pencil survey. Subjects are 
provided with each task individually and instructed to indicate a choice before moving on 
to the next task. This is to ensure that there is no skipping forward or backward during the 
experiment. The subjects make choices in two product categories involving two fast 
moving consumer goods (shampoo and toothpaste) chosen to ensure that subjects have a 
regular buying experience for the given products. Subjects are asked to perform a total of 
10 purchase decisions with 5 decisions in each product category. Before the experiment, 
the participants are randomly assigned to two experimental treatments. In one treatment, 
the participants have the choice between two products in each category and in a second 
treatment, they can choose among three products. The products available consist of a low 
priced brand (L), a medium-priced brand (M) and a high-priced brand (H). The brands 
available in the treatment and product categories are listed in table 1.  
Table 1  Brands used in the experimental treatments 
 Experimental Treatments 2 alternatives 3 alternatives 
Product Categories toothpaste Signal, Odol-med3 + Elmex shampoo Nivea, Elvital + Wella 
 
Six of the seven category-specific price scenarios contained a systematic trade-off 
between the two alternatives L and M, where the price of L increases while the price of 
M decreases. For the treatment with three alternatives, a high-priced brand was added to 
each price scenario that varied randomly around the market price. The fifth price scenario 
is a repetition of one of the four prior price scenarios in order to check for decision 
consistency at the individual level.  
2.2  Experimental procedure 
All participants in this experiment are students from different fields of study at the Otto-
von-Guericke University Magdeburg. While it has to be noted that restricting the sample 
to university students does not necessarily allow for generalizing the results to the general 
population (Peterson 2001), student samples are deemed appropriate for effect 
application research such as studies on context effects (Calder et al. 1981). For the 
products used in this study, the recruited students represent a target group for the specific 
product menu considered in this experiment. Furthermore, the recruited participants were 
filtered to ensure that they have brand knowledge and buying experience with the 
products offered during the experiment. This procedure is implemented to ensure that 
subjects are familiar with the products and do not exhibit uncertainty about the product 
features, creating a simple choice task for the experiment. All products used in the 
experiment are fast moving consumer goods in order to further increase familiarity of the 
choice situation for the participants. 
A total of 152 participants were recruited and randomly assigned to the two treatments, 
with one offering two alternatives and the other offering three alternatives. Furthermore, 
one half of the sessions are run under hypothetical conditions where participants’ choices 
are not realized. The other half is run under real conditions where participants face 
consequences from their choices. The detailed overview of participants and experimental 
treatments is provided in table 2. 
Table 2  Number of participants per treatment 
N=152 Choice Set  
Consequences 2 alternatives 3 alternatives Total 
Hypothetical Choices 35 33 68 
Binding choices  43 41 84 
 
All participants received a show-up fee of 5 Euro for participating in the experiment. For 
this study, payment was received by the participants two weeks before the experiment. 
This procedure is implemented in order to reduce the influence of the house money effect 
(Thaler and Johnson 1990) as far as possible. Within the time between payment and 
experiment, students usually turn over more money than the amount received and it is 
more likely that the payoff is not directly linked to the choices performed during the 
experiment. 
The experiment is conducted at the MaXLab, the experimental laboratory at the 
University of Magdeburg. All participants are placed in experimental cabins in order to 
prevent communication between the participants. At the beginning of the sessions, all 
questions were distributed by the experimenter on a survey. 
For the group with real consequences, the purchase decisions are realized at the end of 
the session. The experimenter draws a ball from an urn with 14 balls numbered from 1 to 
14. The number on the ball indicates the choice scenario that is realized. If the participant 
selected the product for the given price in that scenario, she was obliged to buy the 
product. If the participants did not select the product for the given price in that scenario, 
she did not have the opportunity to buy a product in this experiment. This procedure is 
performed for each participant individually and each time the subject has the chance to 
check the equipment before the procedure is applied. This mechanism resembles a 
random payoff mechanism used in experimental research on anomalies in risky choice 
(Grether and Plott 1979).  
3  Results 
At first glance, a noticeable particularity becomes salient. The third high-priced 
alternative H added to the choice set gains only an insignificant market share below 10% 
in the triplet choice sets under both hypothetical and real choice conditions. Therefore, it 
can reasonably be considered an irrelevant alternative for most of the participants of this 
study. Specifically, the choice share of this irrelevant alternative is negligible and remains 
within the margin of error. 
As for the context-dependence of choice, comparing the choice shares of options L and 
M for the hypothetical condition, the data shows a significant increase of choice share for 
option M for the treatment containing a third alternative (see table 3). For toothpaste, the 
share of M increases from 46% to 84% and for shampoo, the share of M increases from 
45% to 65%, showing in both cases a significant increase of choices for option M in the 
treatment with three alternatives (Chi²-Test, 1%-significance-level). Therefore, the 
experiment under hypothetical conditions confirms the influence of an added irrelevant 
alternative. Thus, context effects as known from marketing literature are confirmed for a 
case where the added alternative is considered an irrelevant alternative with negligible 
choice shares.  
The same effect applies to the setting where the participants face real consequences of 
their purchase decisions. As for the context effect, the choice share of option M increases 
from 52% to 70% for toothpaste and from 36% to 42% for shampoo. The increase in 
choice shares of option M is reduced as compared to the hypothetical (Chi²-Test, 1%-
significance-level) setting, but the difference remains significant between the settings 
with two and three options (Chi²-Test, 10%-significance-level).  
Although our results reveal that hypothetical studies on context effects are likely to 
overstate the impact of adding a third alternative, the effect remains robust for real 
purchase decisions. Therefore, this study provides evidence that a context effect remains 
a systematic effect that applies even to real purchase decisions and is prevalent in 
hypothetical decision-making. Furthermore, this study introduces a third alternative that 
receives almost no choice share and can be considered irrelevant. This means that the 
results stated in this paper show a rather extreme case for context effects, since the added 
product is very unattractive for the participants in its price-quality-tradeoff. 
Table 3  Choice Shares compared by experimental condition 
 
Product category toothpaste shampoo 








L 53% 15% 55% 35% 
M 46% 84% 45% 65% 
H - 1% - 0% 
real 
L 48% 20% 64% 52% 
M 52% 70% 36% 42% 
H - 10% - 6% 
 
The purpose of this study is to show the impact of context effects in individual choice 
behavior when subjects are familiar with the task and face real consequences of their 
decisions. In order to check whether decision error leads to the anomaly under 
consideration, we implement further checks for the validity of the results for the case 
involving real purchase decisions. To do so, the compliance rate is checked for the 
randomly selected decision that is binding and realized (Voelckner 2006). Overall 93% 
fulfilled their buying obligation without declaring discomfort or a complaint by doing so. 
It seems reasonable to assume that these participants were fully aware of the 
consequences when indicating their decisions. Additionally, participants were asked to 
provide direct satisfaction statements before leaving the experiment and after fulfilling 
their transactions. Only two of the subjects indicated regret after fulfilling their buying 
obligation while none of those with the realization of a no-buy option indicated regret. 
The degree of satisfaction with the experimental outcome adds to the impression that 
subjects have a sufficient face validity of their choices (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). 
Finally, the check scenario with a repetition of a choice allows examination for decision 
consistency for each individual subject to exclude choice error as an explanation for the 
phenomenon. In the treatment with two alternatives 93% of the subjects show consistent 
choices and in the treatment with three alternatives 91% are consistent in their indicated 
choices showing no difference between the experimental treatments in this regard (Chi²-
Test, n.s.). This fact provides further evidence that the anomaly under consideration in 
this experiment is not caused by mental overload or increased error probability due to the 
increased complexity of the choice task. 
4  Conclusion 
The list of experiments showing violations of expected utility is long and growing. 
Nonetheless, the normative axioms can still be acceptable for theoretical purposes in 
economics if the violations are random (Quiggin 1982). The effect shown in this 
experiment is systematic and the inclusion of an additional alternative can shift 
preferences in a predictable manner.  
Another argument in favor of expected utility theory is that people behave more in line 
with theoretical predictions when they are experienced in the type of decision-making. 
While this argument can hold for the commonly used decisions under risk, this paper 
provides a choice setting between options that the subjects are highly familiar with. Even 
in an everyday choice context, context effects are systematic and robust for this type of 
choices. The implementation of real consequences reduces context effects, but the 
magnitude remains significantly large. 
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